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Abstract:
Some recent developments in the literature on the political economy of economic growth are
considered in this paper. First, limitations of traditional cross-sectional analysis are discussed.
Attention is focused on the problems of omitted variables and model uncertainty. Advantages and
disadvantages of alternative methods are discussed as well as evidence obtained from the
application of panel techniques and time-series analysis. Second, the relationship between initial
inequality and subsequent economic growth is reconsidered in the light of the empirical evidence
recently produced by contributions that make use of panel models and high-quality data on income
distribution. Third, the role of special interest politics is investigated. Other than lobbying, the
“common-pool” problem is an instance of main interest in the political economy literature. It
predicts that more fragmented governments are associated to lower growth. I test this prediction on
a panel of western European countries. Results appear to be consistent with the theoretical
argument.
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Introduction
The search for the determinants of economic growth is a very active area of study in the economic
profession. My reading of this literature is that more and more attention is being devoted to political
and institutional factors as potential sources of cross-country variation of growth rates. In this paper,
I intend to investigate what I believe are the most recent advances in the political economy of
growth. I start in Section 1 with an econometric issue. The large majority of empirical results
concerning the role of political variables have been obtained within the standard framework of
informal cross-country growth regressions. However, the estimation and the interpretation of such
regressions involve substantial problems that are often neglected, such as the one of omitted
variables or model uncertainty. In Section 2 I turn to the issue of how income inequality affects
subsequent growth
1. A broad consensus has now emerged in the literature that income inequality is
harmful for growth. The attention of scholars has been therefore focused on identifying the channels
through which inequality lowers growth. Recently, this common belief has been challenged. Once
more reliable measures of inequality are used to estimate panel (rather than cross-country) models,
the sign of the relationship becomes positive. This has clearly spurred new interest towards
alternative theories that predict a growth-enhancing effect of income inequality. Finally, in Section
3 I look at a new frontier of theoretical research and conduct an econometric analysis of the
predictions generated by one of such models.
Section 1. Econometric issues
1.1 Theoretical framework and augmented cross-section regressions.
The common theoretical framework underlying most of the empirical framework on the
determinants of growth is the neo-classical (Solow) model augmented with human capital,
originally proposed by  Mankiw,  Romer and  Weil (1992), henceforth MRW. The aggregate
production function for a generic country is written as:
(1.1)  b a b a - - = 1 ) (AN H K Y   with a > 0, b > 0, a + b < 1.
                                                       
1 Notice that I will focus on the impact of inequality on the dynamics of growth and not on the contemporaneous
relationship between the two (i.e. the Kuznets curve). For an optimal survey of how growth affects inequality see
Aghion et al. (1999).3
where Y is aggregate income, K denotes the stock of physical capital, H is the stock of human
capital, N is labour force and A is an index of technological efficiency.
The following assumptions are stated with respect to factors accumulation:
(1.2.a)    0 / ‡ = x A A &  and the level of A at time t = 0 is A(0) > 0;
(1.2.b)   0 / ‡ =u N N &  and the level of N at time t = 0 is N(0) > 0;
(1.2.c)    K Y K k k d t - = &       with  0 , > k k d t
(1.2.d)    K Y H h h d t - = &      with   0 , > h h d t
Rates of physical and human capital investment (tk and th) are thus assumed to be constant. The
additional restriction that both types of capital depreciate at the same rate is also imposed (that is, dk
= dh = d). By approximating around the steady state, MRW show that the growth rate of income




) 1 ( ln
1
) 1 (                             
ln
1


























t t t t
e e
e y e e t A e y t y
where y denotes per-capita income, t denotes time and  ) )( 1 ( x u d b a l + + - - - = < 0 is the rate of
convergence to the country’s steady state (conditional convergence).
Equation (1.3) identifies four basic determinants of growth: income at time 0 (the so called “initial
level of income”), human capital investment, physical capital investment and labour force growth
(which is often assumed to be equal to population growth). It is worth stressing the role of initial
income. As e
lt < 1, a higher initial level of per-capita income reduces subsequent growth. This is
the conditional convergence result: given two countries identical under all respects except than for
initial income, the poorer of the two will grow faster during the transition to steady state. Notice
that this is not equivalent to say that poorer countries will completely catch up with richer ones
since steady states are different across countries.
A typical problem in the econometric implementation of equation (1.3) is that the initial level of
technological efficiency A(0) should be included among the set of regressors. However, given the
lack of suitable proxies for A, the term in A(0) tend to be omitted. This omission in turn implies that
results from the cross-sectional estimation of the growth regression are most likely to be biased. A
possible solution is to parametrize A. This means augmenting the basic set of regressors to include a4
vector of additional explanatory variables of which  A should be a (linear) function. The main
difficulty in following such a route is that it is not clear what lays beneath technological efficiency.
There are many factors that may affect the aggregate amount of output, given the aggregate amount
of inputs, and most of these factors (once identified) are also hard to measure empirically. The
consequence is that most researchers have estimated cross-sectional growth regressions that include
a variety of different explanatory variables often chosen ad hoc or on the grounds of simple prima
facia relevance to growth and technological efficiency. The general form of these augmented (or
informal) growth regressions
2 can thus be specified as:
(1.4)  e + + + + + = n nx b x b x b a y .... 2 2 1 1
where y is a vector of rates of economic growth, x1….xn are vectors of explanatory variables and
b1…bn are vectors of parameters to be estimated. As noted by Sala-i-Martin (1997, page 2), the set
of explanatory variables “vary across researchers and across papers”. He reports that 63 variables
have been found to be significant in at least one published paper.
Most of the results on the political determinants of economic growth are obtained from the cross-
sectional estimation of model (1.4). Table 1 in the Appendix reports a summary of main
contributions and results. It appears that the type of regime (democracy vs. dictatorship) and income
inequality are probably the two most investigated political-economic explanations of growth. Notice
also the large variety of empirical proxies used to capture the impact of political instability.
1.2 Problems with cross-section estimation and alternative econometric procedures.
Rather frequently, researchers report that regional dummy variables display significant estimated
coefficients when added to the r.h.s. of cross-country regressions. This is a signal that some region-
specific (or even country-specific) factor affects economic growth and it is not correctly captured by
the explanatory variables of the model. Furthermore, it is often the case that the inclusion of the
regional dummies makes the estimated coefficients on other regressors not statistically different
from zero. This suggests that these coefficients do not capture the impact of the associated
regressors on growth, but rather, they account for the role of the omitted regional-specific effect.
This is an instance of the omitted variables problem. When some of the regressors included in the
model are correlated with the omitted variable (as it could be the case, for instance, when the
                                                       
2 Regressions of this type are sometimes called Barro’s cross-country growth regressions since they are based on the
seminal work by Barro (1989 and 1991).5
unobservable level of technological efficiency is neglected in the econometric implementation of
the MRW equation), then parameter estimates are biased.
The determination of the direction of this bias can be difficult to be determined a priori. A typical
example is the bias generated by the omission of country-specific effects in growth regressions that
include a measure of income inequality on the r.h.s. As noted by Forbes (2000), suppose that the
country-specific effect is represented by country’s degree of capitalism and country’s degree of
bureaucratic inefficiency and that both factors are omitted from the model specification (because
not observable and difficult to measure). The degree of capitalism is positively correlated with both
inequality and growth and therefore its omission generates a positive bias on the estimated
coefficient of the measure of income inequality. The degree of bureaucratic inefficiency is
positively correlated with inequality and negatively correlated with growth. Its omission therefore
generates a negative bias on the estimated coefficient of the measure of income inequality. The
overall direction of the bias would thus be ambiguous.
If country-specific effects are time invariant, then consistent parameter estimates can be obtained by
applying panel data techniques.  This is done, for instance, by Benhabib and Spiegel (1997), who
estimate the following growth regression:
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where i now denotes a specific country, ymax is the output per worker in the country with the highest
output per worker,  Zi(t) is a set of “ancillary” variables (that include the degree of political
instability and an indicator of income inequality) and the constant term  a is decomposed into
economy-specific and time-specific effects: a = fi + qt. This decomposition permits to adjust for
country-specific (time invariant) characteristics through fixed effects.
The theory underlying model (1.5) is one of endogenous growth, where total factor productivity
(that is, lnAi(t) – lnAi(t-1)) is determined by the current level of human capital (rather than the
growth of human capital) and the disparity of technology levels from the leader nation (proxied by
ymax(t)/y(t)). Benhabib and Spiegel also estimate a reduced form of (1.5) that includes the lagged
value of per capita income instead of the interactive term in the disparity of technology. They obtain
interesting results on the political determinants of growth. Political instability (measured by a
dummy variable that takes value 1 if in period t a coup or a major government change is observed)6
and income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient on land and income) do not significantly
affect the rate of economic growth. These results are quite different from those obtained in cross-
sectional regressions and summarised in Table 1. In particular, it is clear from Table 1 that there is a
large consensus in the literature that the relationship between inequality and growth is negative and
statistically significant. With respect to political instability the consensus is less strong (there is also
higher variation in the definition of proxies for instability across papers), but still a large proportion
of contributions conclude that the relationship is negative and again statistically robust.
The use of panel data estimation techniques also permits to overcome the problem of possible
endogeneity of regressors and growth. For instance, if it is true that political instability is a possible
determinant of economic growth, it might also be true that economic growth (or the economic
performance in general) affects the degree of political instability and violence. Thus it can be
problematic to interpret the estimated coefficient on an indicator of political instability in terms of
cause/effect. The econometric literature identifies instrumental variables estimation as an obvious
strategy in case of potential joint endogeneity of the dependent variable and one or more of the
explanatory variables. The shortage of good instruments implies that often the best possible way to
proceed is to instrument regressors by their lagged values. Clearly, this is possible only within a
panel framework and only if the time span of data is sufficiently long. As a matter of fact, in the
previously mentioned work, Benhabib and Spiegel (1997) tackle the issue of joint endogeneity of
economic and political regressors by using lagged values of endogenous variables as instruments
and then applying the generalised method of moments estimation. Along similar lines are the
studies by Caselli et al. (1996) and Easterly et al. (1996).
Another limitation of cross-sectional regressions relates to parameter heterogeneity. As pointed out
by Durlauf and Quah (1998) and Temple (1999), cross-country studies always include a very large
number of countries characterised by relevant differences in their social, political and institutional
structure. This implies that the parameter estimates obtained from a common regression are difficult
to interpret and possibly inconsistent. Again, a feasible way out is panel estimation. Ideally, one
would estimate a panel with stochastic parameters, but this requires longer time-series of data than
those currently available for most countries. In the wait of longer time-series to become available,
the larger number of degrees of freedom that a panel allows can be exploited to implement less
sophisticated (but still effective) methods, such as robust estimation, sample split and group
dummies.
In general, panel estimation might be used to improve on the cross-sectional results. Two caveats
are however necessary. First, cross-section analysis is not to be completely disregarded. It has
provided some important and useful insights and it can be a valuable complementary instrument of7
analysis (to be combined, for instance, with historical studies or even with panel analysis). Second,
panel estimation is not immune from shortcomings. One is that it does not adjust for omitted
variables that vary across time. Another relates to fact that to depurate growth rates from short-run
disturbances, scholars often average annual growth rate over n-year periods. But the choice of n is
often arbitrary; that is, there is no clear reason why some choose 5-year periods whilst other choose
10-year periods. The problem is substantial if it is true that, as the results in Forbes (2000) seem to
suggest, not necessarily estimates obtained from 5-year averages are identical to estimates obtained
from 10-year averages. Then simply changing the length of observation spells would lead to
different conclusions on what determines growth.
The choice of the estimator to be used with the panel model is also subtle. Suppose that the
regression equation is specified so to include per-capita income in period t-1 as a determinant of the
growth rate of per-capita income in period t. Then the model can be immediately re-written as a per-
capita income regression with a lagged dependent variable. In this case, the fixed effects and the
random effects estimators, which are so popular among scholars, can be significantly biased.
Alternative estimation methods (such as the  Arellano-Bond Generalised Method of Moments)
requires that a relatively large sample of observations is available for standard errors of estimated
coefficients to be correctly computed. Otherwise, if the sample is too small, then standard errors
will also be excessively small and the statistical significance of estimated coefficients artificially
increased.
In alternative to (or in association with) cross-section and panel data models,  time-series analysis
could be used, at lest to the extent that sufficiently long spans of good quality data are available for
the country under investigation. Quah (1992) and Bernard and Durlauf (1996) use unit roots and
cointegration analysis to investigate the issue of b-convergence. In the field of political economy, a
time-series approach is employed by Fielding (2000) to evaluate the consequences of the Intifada
on the rate of capital accumulation in Israel. Since the series of his indicators of political instability
(number of Israelis killed, number of Arabs killed, rate of growth of the number of buildings
constructed in the West Bank area) are not integrated of order 1, he first estimates a cointegrating
relationship between investments in two types of goods (non-residential construction and
equipment), real interest rate (adjusted for capital depreciation), real wage rate and output of the
average firm. Then he constructs a regression model where the change in investment is the
dependent variable and the set of  regressors include economic variables, the political variables
(inclusive of a dummy to isolate periods of left-wing government) and the residuals from the
cointegrating vector estimated for investment. He obtains that both the number of Israelis killed and
the rate of growth of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza areas have a significantly8
negative impact on investment in non-residential constructions.  Manufactoring and equipment
investment is instead significantly lower when the total number of deaths and rate of growth of
Jewish settlements increase. Fielding also conducts tests to verify whether political indicators are
exogenous to investment and he finds support for the hypothesis of weak exogeneity (so that the
casuality effectively goes from political factors to capital accumulation).
1.3 Model uncertainty and robustness of results in cross-section growth regressions
A key issue in the econometric analysis of growth determinants concerns the specification of the
regression model. As previously noted, most of the work in this area is based on the cross-sectional
estimation of equation (1.4). The definition of the set of explanatory variables is often arbitrary:
researchers simply add  regressors with prima  facia relevance to growth in the hope to obtain
statistically significant estimated coefficients and an overall good fitness of the model. This exercise
has surely generated interesting results and stimulated further empirical as well as theoretical work.
Nevertheless, the proliferation of explanatory variables and the relatively loose link with the theory
rise the question of the “robustness” of these results.
 The standard approach in the cross-section literature is to estimate a growth equation with a basic
set of explanatory variables, identify those coefficients that pass a zero restriction test at some given
confidence level (usually 1%, 5% or 10%) and then check the robustness of these findings by
estimating several alternative model specifications to see how the estimated coefficients change.
This sensitivity analysis is successful, in the sense that key findings are regarded as being robust, if
the variables of interest display stable (in sign and size) and statistically significant coefficients
when the set of the other regressors changes. However, Levine and Renelt (1992) argue that this
procedure is not conclusive and that most of the findings reported in the literature might not be
robust to more systematic tests. More specifically, they refer to the Extreme-Bounds Analysis
(EBA) originally proposed by Leamer (1983) and obtain that for almost none of the 50 look at a
robust correlation with growth can be identified. The only exceptions are the correlations between
growth and the share of investment in GDP and between the investment share and the ratio of
international trade to GDP. In particular, with respect to political variables, they conclude that
indexes of revolutions and coups and civil liberties are not robustly correlated with growth.
However, they do find a robust correlation between revolution and coups and the share of
investment.
Sala-i-Martin (1997) challenges the conclusion of Levine and Renelt by arguing that the EBA is
unnecessarily restrictive. In a nutshell, the idea incorporated in the EBA is that for a correlation9
between a generic regressor z and the rate of growth to be robust, the estimated coefficient on z
must be found statistically significant in a very large number of different model specifications.
3
Sala-i-Martin proposes a less extreme test. For each variable z he estimates 30,856 regressions and
computes the cumulative distribution function lying on each side of zero (CDF(0)) of the estimator
of the coefficient on z. Then, assuming that the usual confidence level is 95%, robust correlations
are those for which the CDF(0) is above 0.95.
4 An implication of these methods is that a variable
whose coefficient is not significant 100% of the times is not necessarily classified as non robust (as
it is the case instead with the EBA). That is, CDF (0) might be above the threshold 0.95 even if in
some of the 30,856 tries the estimated coefficient changes sign or becomes not different from zero.
Sala-i-Martin provides two sets of results, one refers to the case where the group of fixed variables
(see footnotes 3 and 4) does not include the investment rate and the other refers to the case where
the investment rate is included as a fixed variable (and hence estimated coefficient measures the
impact of the associated variable on the “level of efficiency”). Findings are rather similar in the two
cases. With respect to political variables he finds that the index of civil liberties (but not the index
of democracy), the number of revolutions and coups, a dummy variable for war and an index of rule
of law are all robustly correlated with growth when investment is not among the fixed variables. For
the number of political assassinations and an index of political instability the CDF(0) is instead
much below the significance threshold. When investments are included as a fixed variable, both the
dummy for war and the number of revolutions and coups do not robustly correlate with growth.
This means that wars and frequency of irregular government transfers affect economic growth
mostly through investment, whilst for the rule of law and civil liberties there seems to be also an
effect on the level of efficiency. A robust impact on the level of efficiency is also traced back to the
degree of enforcement of political rights. However, the aggregate level of democracy of the country
does not seem to correlate robustly with growth, neither through efficiency nor through investment.
In a recent contribution Ley and Steel (1999) implement a test of robustness somehow similar to the
one proposed by Sala-i-Martin, but based on Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA). In line with the
Bayesian approach, for each potential determinant of growth they compute posterior probabilities of
                                                       
3 To be precise, let S be the set of all variables whose correlation with growth has to be tested (i.e. S = 50 in Levine and
Renelt). Then, four of these variables (initial level of income, investment rate, secondary school enrolment rate and the
rate of population growth) are always included in the regression, together with z and up to three other variables from the
pool S. The total number of regressions estimated to evaluate the robustness of the correlation between z and economic
growth is equal to the number of combinations of three variables out of the pool S (excluded the four variables which
are fixed and always included). If in just one of these regressions the sign of the coefficient on z changes, or becomes
not statistically different from zero, then the correlation between z and the rate of growth is considered to be not robust.
4 As Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin estimates regressions with four fixed variables, the variable z and exactly
three other regressors out of the pool of S (in his case S = 62). Then the total number of regressions estimated for the
variable z is equal to the number of combinations of 58 variables in sets of three: 58!/[3!55!] = 30,856.10
inclusion in the growth equation. Variables that display a posterior probability above 0.8 are
considered as “important regressors”, variables that display a posterior probability below 0.2 are
regarded as “not important”.  Ley and Steel use the same data-set as Sala-i-Martin and henceforth
their results can be compared. Two main political variables have posterior probability above 0.8: the
index of rule of law (which is also found to be robustly correlated with growth by Sala-i-Martin)
and the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, which is often taken to be a proxy for socio-
political instability.  Consistent with the findings reported by Sala-i-Martin is also the conclusion
that the war dummy is not important. Of the other political indicators considered by Sala-i-Martin,
revolutions and coups are the least important determinants of growth according to Ley and Steel,
with a posterior probability of less than 5%. Civili liberties and political rights lay instead in the
large area of variables with posteriors included between 0.2 and 0.8. 
5
All in all, once model uncertainty is acknowledged and specific tests of robustness undertaken,
there is still evidence that various political factors affect growth. The EBA test is extremely
restrictive and leads to the conclusion that almost nothing robustly correlates with growth.
However, among the very few things that correlates with investment (which in turn correlates with
growth) is the average number of revolutions and coups in a country. The test based on the CDF (0)
and the BMA test instead identifies several variables which are important determinants of growth.
Although results are not fully consistent across these two latter tests, it seems that political violence
and limitation of civil liberties do have a robust growth-depressing role.
Section 2. Issues on the relationship between income inequality and economic growth.
2.1 The  “common belief”: initial inequality is harmful for subsequent economic growth.
6
Theoretical contributions
A striking piece of evidence that appears from Table 1 is the widespread agreement in the empirical
literature on the fact that initial inequality in the distribution of income or wealth negatively affects
subsequent economic growth. Three different mechanisms have been identified that might explain
this relationship: endogenous fiscal policy, socio-political instability and credit market
                                                       
5 Ley and Steel do not keep a set of fixed regressors. Thus the investment rate enters some of the regressions estimated
for the generic regressor z, but not all of them.
6 By “initial” it is meant that inequality is pre-determined to economic growth. In theoretical models, it is inequality in
the first period that determines growth in the subsequent periods. In applied work, inequality is measured at the
beginning of the sample period over which economic growth is computed.11
imperfections. This latter does not explicitly builds on political-economic considerations and will
thus receive less attention.
Models of endogenous fiscal policy use the median voter theorem to determine the capital tax rate
as a function of the distribution of income and wealth across individuals in the economy. In Persson
and Tabellini (1994) taxation is purely redistributive and individuals differ in terms of their initial
endowment of resources available for capital investment. Under majority voting and with single
peaked utility functions, the tax rate chosen by voters is equal to the tax rate preferred by the
individual at the median of the distribution of endowments. The more unequal the society (that is,
the more right-skewed the distribution), the smaller the median endowment relative to the average
and the higher the tax rate preferred by the median voter. By reducing after-tax return from capital
accumulation, higher tax rates negatively affect economic growth. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) reach
the same conclusion, but in a setting where capital taxation is used to finance public services which
in turn increase productivity of labour and capital (as in Barro, 1990). Chang (1998) considers the
case where government is shared by two parties representing different constituencies. Tax rates are
not determined by the application of the median voter theorem, but result from an inter-party
bargaining game. The sustainable equilibrium outcome of this game is characterised by the fact that
a wider gap between capitalists and workers (the two constituencies) generates a more redistributive
policy which in turn reduces the rate of economic growth.
Models of socio-politcal instability posit that a more unequal distribution of wealth is a source of
social distress and illegal seizure of power (Gupta, 1990 and Alesina and Perotti, 1996). When a
large group of very poor face a small group of very rich, then the discontent of the former is most
likely to degenerate into revolutions, coups and riots. Furthermore, as suggested by Sala-i-Martin
(1992) and Fay (1993), poorer individuals often engage in illegal activities. Both political violence
and widespread crime reduce entrepreneurs’ incentive to invest by making them more uncertain
about the future course of economic policy (revolutions and coups might be followed by the
nationalisation of private companies, for instance) and the possibility to appropriate the return from
their investments. This argument is close in spirit to the case of the “Tragedy of the Commons”
(Tornell and Velasco,1992) where the lack of enforcement of property rights is a source of under-
investment and low growth.
Finally, models that incorporate credit market imperfections build on the work by Galor and Zeira
(1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997). The basic idea is that in the presence of such imperfections,
poorer individuals cannot exploit profitable investment opportunities. For instance, they cannot
invest in education or, alternatively, provide little effort in trying to make a risky investment12
successful. More inequality implies that more agents are prevented from investing and hence that
economic growth (engined by physical and human capital accumulation) is ceteris paribus lower.
Empirical evidence on the importance of the various channels
The above mentioned models all generate the same “reduced form” prediction: initial inequality is
harmful for subsequent economic growth. However, their predictions concerning the channel
through which inequality affects growth are rather different. According to the models of
endogenous fiscal policy (i) more initial inequality generates more redistribution and (ii) more
redistribution reduces economic growth. The models of socio-political instability instead predict
that (i) more inequality generates more instability and (ii) instability negatively correlates with
economic growth. Finally, the credit market imperfections argument suggests that (i) for any degree
of capital market imperfections, more inequality is associated to a lower investment in education (or
human capital accumulation) and (ii) human capital accumulation positively correlates with
economic growth. Table 2 reports a summary of findings. Below I limit the discussion to the
empirical work on the first two classes of models (those that are based on political-economic
considerations).
The endogenous fiscal policy argument does not appear to receive much support from the data.
None of the papers surveyed reports that the initial level of inequality is positively correlated to the
extent of redistribution (as measured by the GDP share of social security or the marginal tax rate).
At the same time, redistribution tends to be a positive (rather than negative) determinant of
economic growth.  Perotti (1996) provides systematic evidence on both points. He estimates a
system of two structural equations. The first one is a growth equation, where the set of explanatory
variables include the marginal tax rate. The second one is an equation for the marginal tax rate that
includes on the r.h.s. a measure of pre-determined income inequality (share in income of the third
and fourth quintiles at the beginning of the sample period). The system is estimated by two-stages
least squares. The coefficient on the marginal tax rate in the growth equation is positive and
statistically significant at usual confidence levels. This means that more redistribution is positive for
economic growth. The coefficient of the index of income equality in the regression of the tax rate is
instead negative, as predicted by the theory, but largely insignificant at usual confidence levels.
That is, more unequal societies are not necessarily those that undertake more redistributve policies.
Results do not change when the system is re-estimated on the sample of only democratic countries
and when different proxies for redistribution and inequality are used.
7
                                                       
7 The median voter theorem is most appropriate to represent the political mechanism in a democratic country.
Therefore, it might be argued that predictions from the models of endogenous fiscal policy should be consistent with the
experience of democracies.13
Certainly more supported by the evidence is the theory of socio-political instability. As Table 2
shows, all papers surveyed report a positive correlation between inequality and instability, whilst
Table 1 displays a rather long list of contributions where the coefficient on instability in the growth
regression is negative. A typical problem encountered by researchers is the potential joint
endogeneity of socio-political instability and growth. If instability is not measured at the beginning
of the sample period, but as the sample period average, then its estimated coefficient in a cross-
sectional growth regression does not provide information on the direction of the casual relationship.
Alesina and  Perotti (1996) address this econometric issue by estimating a system of two
simultaneous equations, one for the ratio of real domestic investment to real GDP (INV) and the
other for an index of socio-political instability (SPI). SPI is among the explanatory variables of the
investment equation, whilst INV and an index of equality of income distribution (EQ) are among
the regressors of the socio-political instability equation. Notice that, to the extent that investment is
the engine of economic growth, the effect of SPI on INV translates into an effect on per-capita
income growth. The index of SPI is computed for each country in the sample as the first principal
component of disaggregated data on political death, assassinations, coups and the country’s degree
of democracy. It turns out that the estimated coefficient on EQ in the regression of SPI is negative
and statistically different from zero. Thus, more equal societies do seem to experience a lower
degree of social violence. The coefficient on INV is instead not different from zero. In the
regression of INV, the coefficient on SPI is negative and largely significant. This means that even
after controlling for possible joint endogeneity, there is clear evidence that socio-political instability
negatively affect investments and hence growth. Perotti (1996) adopts a similar procedure, but
replaces the investment equation with a standard growth equation. He obtains results that are fully
consistent with those reported by  Alesina and  Perotti: inequality determines instability and
instability determines growth.
2.2 A new way of looking at the issue: high quality data and fixed effects estimators.
An important issue in the empirical analysis of the relationship between income inequality and
economic growth is the one of possible measurement errors due to the relatively poor quality of
available income inequality data.
8 However, a new data-set has been recently made available by
Deininger and Squire (1996) that contains only “high quality” data. These are data that satisfy three
                                                                                                                                                                                       
8 Most of the studies reported in Tables 1 and 2 make use of three data-sets: Paukert (1973), Jain (1975) and Lecaillon
et al. (1984). Paukert himself admits that some of the observations in his data–set are “of rather doubtful value”
(Paukert, 1973, pag. 125). The issue of the quality of income distribution data is also addressed by Perotti (1996).14
basic quality standards: (i) they are based on household surveys and not estimated from national
accounts statistics, (ii) they have comprehensive coverage of all sources of income, (iii) they are
representative of the population at national level, rather than of only some specific sectors (such as
urban population or taxpayers).
Interestingly,  Deininger and Squire (1996 and 1998) report that the number of observations in
existing data-sets that satisfy these three quality standards is rather small. For instance, out of the
405 data points in Jain (1975), only 61 can be regarded as “high quality”. Similarly, the data-set
used by Persson and Tabellinni (1994), which is based on Paukert (1973), contains 55 observations,
but only 18 of them meet the quality standards. Of better quality are the data used by Alesina and
Rodrik (1994) and Perotti (1996), but still quite a considerable quota of their sample observations
do not satisfy the criteria. Give that measurement errors are a potentially very important source of
biased estimates (see Temple, 1999), the Deninger and Squire data-set offers a new way of looking
at the issue of how inequality determines economic growth and all most recent studies in the area
make use of it.
Deininger and Squire (1998), DS henceforth, use their data to estimate the following cross-section
growth regression:
(1.6)  e b b b a + + + + = i i i i GINI INV GDP g 3 2 1 60
where g is the growth rate of per-capita income, GDP60 is per-capita income in 1960, INV is capital
accumulation (as defined by Summer and Heston, 1991), GINI is the Gini coefficient of income or
land, i denotes a generic country and g and INV are averaged over the sample period 1960-1992.
Equation (1.6) is a simple version of a Barro’s type equation. A problem with its implementation is
that the term on income inequality (GINI) should pre-determined relative to growth. That is, one
would ideally use observations on the Gini coefficient in, or around, 1960. However, for the Gini
coefficient of the income distribution, the high quality data of DS go back to 1960 only for a very
small group of countries. To avoid estimating a regression with an extremely small number of
degrees of freedom, the authors adopt the two following strategies. First, they estimate a regression
using averages of all the observations available (for a given country) of the Gini coefficient of
income over the whole sample period. In other words, they average the variable GINI over the
period 1960-1992 as it is done for g and INV. In fact, this implies that GINI is not pre-determined to
growth. Although DS argue that Gini coefficients are rather stable within countries, there is plenty
of theoretical and empirical literature suggesting that growth and income distribution are jointly15
endogenous.
9 Henceforth, estimated coefficients on GINI would not be informative on the direction
of the casual relationship. The second strategy DS adopt is to use the Gini coefficient on land
distribution, for which observations at 1960 are available for a larger number of countries.
Estimates of the coefficient b3 in equation (1.6) are broadly consistent with previous results in the
literature: inequality negatively correlates with growth. However, the inclusion of regional dummies
for Latin-America, African and Asian countries makes the estimated coefficient b3 not statistically
different from zero when inequality is measured by the average income Gini and significant only at
the 10% level of confidence when inequality is measured by the 1960 land Gini. Of the regional
dummies, only the one for Asian countries displays a significant (positive) coefficient. Interestingly,
when both measures of inequality (average income Gini and 1960 land Gini) are included on the
r.h.s. of equation (1.6) together with the three dummies, the coefficient on average income Gini
remains insignificant, whilst the one on 1960 land Gini becomes significant at around the 5% level
of confidence. The same results are obtained when the growth regression is estimated only on the
group of developing countries (in this latter case, however, the very small number of observations,
27, makes results more difficult to interpret). Finally, when DS split the sample of countries
between democratic and non democratic countries they find that (land) inequality affects growth in
the second, but not in the first group.
Overall, DS obtain results which are not particularly innovative relative to the studies that use data-
sets of lower quality. Moreover, the DS analysis is based on the cross-sectional estimation of a
growth regression and therefore all the methodological instances raised in Section 1 can be
advanced. In particular, the results concerning the inclusion of regional dummies might indicate that
there are omitted regional or country-specific effects.
Benhabib and Spiegel (1997) combine the high-quality data of DS with panel estimation in order to
control for time-invariant, country specific effects. Their basic regression model is given by
equation (1.5), with income Gini coefficients of high quality included among the set of ancillary
variables Z. Using a fixed effect estimator, Benhabib and Spiegel find that the coefficient on the
inequality measure is negative, but again not statistically different from zero. The result holds when
the regression is re-estimated without fixed effects; that is, using a simple pooled OLS estimator.
Similarly, when the lagged value of per-capita income replaces the term  lnHi(t)[ymax(t)/yit] in
equation (1.5) basic findings on the impact of inequality are not altered. Benhabib and Spiegel also
consider an interactive term GINI*LLY, where LLY is a measure of the ratio of liquid liabilities of
the financial sector to GDP.
10 The idea is that, following models that incorporate capital market
                                                       
9 See, for instance, the survey by Aghion et al. (1999).
10 Benhabib and Spiegel choose the monetary aggregate M2 as a proxy for liquid liabilities.16
imperfections, inequality is most likely to have a negative impact on growth at low levels of a
country’s financial development. But the coefficient on this interactive term is again not statistically
different from zero. Both, income Gini coefficient and the interactive term are also found to play no
relavant role in physical and human capital accumulation.
11 This pattern of results thus represents a
challenge to the common belief that income inequality significantly reduces subsequent economic
growth.
2.3 Empirical and theoretical challenges to the “common belief”
Perotti (1996) and Deininger and Squire (1998) both find that the inclusion of regional dummies in
the growth regression dramatically reduces the level of significance of the estimated coefficients on
measures of income inequality. Controlling for country-specific, time invariant fixed effects,
Benhabib and Spiegel (1997) conclude that income inequality does not significantly affect the rate
of economic growth or factors accumulation. All these are results that question the “common
belief” that a more unequal distribution of wealth reduces growth A further important challenge to
this belief is represented by the findings reported by Forbes (2000). Similarly to Benhabib and
Spiegel (1997), she uses the high quality DS data-set to estimate a panel model based on the
following growth equation:
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where gi(t) is the average annual growth rate for country i in period t, GINIi(t-1) is the income Gini
coefficient for country i in period t-1, GDPi(t-1) is log of per-capita income in country i in period t-
1, EDUCMi (t-1) and EDUCFi (t-1) are the average years of secondary schooling in the male and
female population respectively for country i in period t-1, PPPIi(t-1) is the price level of investment
(measured as the PPP of investment/exchange rate relative to US) for country i in period t-1, ai are
country dummies, h(t) are period dummies and mi(t) are disturbances.
Notice that  gi(t) in equation (1.7) is simply equal to  GDPi(t) –  GDPi (t-1). Operating this
substitution on the l.h.s. and rearranging terms, one immediately notices that equation (1.7) involves
                                                                                                                                                                                       
11 The investment equation is specified as: INVit = constant + GDPit + Zit, where Zit is an ancillary variable (the
interactive term GINI*LLY, for instance). The human capital accumulation equation is specified as: DLAB*EDUCit =
constant + GDPit + Zit, where DLAB is the annual growth rate of labour force and EDUC are the average years of
schooling for adults over 25 years of age at time t.17
a lagged dependent variable (GDP). Both the fixed and the random effect estimators are biased in
this case. The impact of this bias is particularly strong when the panel consists of a rather long
cross-section dimension relative to the time dimension. In Forbes' sample, 45 countries are
included, the length of generic period t is set equal to five years and the total sample period is 30
years (1965-1995). Thus, for each country, at most 6 observations are taken: the fixed and random
effect estimators are likely to be severely biased. To correct for this bias, Forbes adopts the Arellano
and Bond Methods of Moments (Arellano and Bond, 1991). She obtains that the estimated
coefficient on GINI is positive and strongly significant at usual confidence levels.
12 That is, she
obtains that more income inequality is positive for future economic growth. The result is robust to
changes in the model specification and in the definition of variables.
A few caveats must be noticed. First, when applied to small samples, the  Arellano and Bond
Method generates excessively small standard errors, thus artificially increasing the statistical
significance of estimated coefficients (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). It might well be the case that
inequality has no relevant impact on growth (as it is found by Benhabib abd Spiegel, 1997), but that
the small sample bias of the estimator leads to the conclusion that the positive coefficient is
significant. Second, the focus on high quality income data might produce a sample selection bias. It
is frequently observed that better data are available from richer and more equal countries. In fact,
Forbes notes that half of her sample consists of OECD countries and no Sub-Saharan country is
represented. In her sensitivity analysis she explicitly tackles this issue by experimenting with
alternative functional forms of the basic specification. In particular, she finds that squared and
cubed terms on inequality do not display significant coefficients. She therefore rejects the
hypothesis of a non-linear relationship between inequality and growth. This in turn implies that
unbalanced regional coverage is not likely to seriously affect econometric results.
Third, the choice of a five year period is arbitrary. In fact, when she re-estimates the model taking
ten year averages, she obtains that the coefficient on inequality is still positive, but now not
significant at usual confidence levels. Fourth, as noted by Forbes herself, using five year periods she
inevitably focuses on the short and medium-term relationship between inequality and growth within
individual countries. In this sense, her results do not necessarily contradict those obtained in the
traditional cross-sectional literature, where taking averages over three decades implies a focus on
the long-run relationship between the two variables across countries. Fifth, a more general criticism
is that the DS criteria are too restrictive and imply an unnecessary drop in the number of available
observations (Atkinson and Brandolini, 1999).
                                                       
12 For the sake of the discussion, she also obtains a negative and significant coefficient on GDP and on the proxy for
market distortions PPPI, a positive and significant coefficient on EDUF and an insignificant coefficient on EDUM.18
In spite of these caveats, it is clear that these recent empirical findings do represent an innovation
relative to the widespread agreement that results from cross-sectional literature. Then the question is
whether the theory could account for a positive relationship between inequality and growth. In fact,
Saint Paul and Verdier (1996) elaborate some theoretical argument essentially based on political-
economic considerations to sustain that inequality is not necessarily harmful for growth.
A first possibility is that more unequal societies effectively undertake more redistributive policies,
but redistribution does not reduce economic growth. This positive link between redistribution and
growth (rather commonly reported in the empirical literature) can arise in a model where inequality
generates socio-political instability and widespread crime, which in turn reduce capital
accumulation and hence constraint future economic growth. Redistributive polices, by reducing the
gap between the large group of poor and the small elite of rich, would disincentivate radical protests
and favour peaceful (regular) alternation in office of different constituencies. At the same time,
these policies would also bribe poor people out of illegal activities, thus generating a more
favourable climate for private entrepreneurship and investments. Redistribution can also benefit
economic growth in a capital market imperfections framework where poorer individuals are
liquidity constrained. Transfers would allow them to undertake investments (i.e. human capital
accumulation) that engine growth. Similarly, if a large fraction of individuals cannot invest in
education, then redistribution that goes through public education certainly has growth-promoting
effects. Finally, at some stage of development, a condition for economic growth is the existence of a
strong aggregate demand for a broad range of manufactures. Wealth redistribution can help creating
this condition, especially in countries where there is no middle class.
The theoretical idea that redistribution is positive for growth does receive some empirical support
(as previously noted and as it can be seen from Table 2). However, even rejecting this hypothesis,
one can account for a positive link between inequality and growth by constructing an argument
where the degree of redistributive policies undertaken in a country is inversely correlated to income
inequality. Again, there is some evidence that this might indeed be the case (see Table 2). Saint Paul
and Verdier (1996) develops two theoretical argument to sustain this point. One is based on the idea
that political participation is endogenous. Richer voters are probably better organised and more
interested in politics than poorer voters. This implies that the participation rate of the richer is
higher and therefore that the endowment of the pivotal voter is greater than the median endowment.
In this sense, using the median voter theorem to identify the social choice of the tax rate would be
misleading and unequal societies would not necessarily be associated to higher  redistributive
taxation. The other argument is that a positive link between inequality and redistribution is obtained
under the assumption that any mean preserving spread in income distribution will increase the19
skewness of the distribution. This in turn reduces the median/mean ratio and the level of taxation
preferred by the median voter. But, there is simply no theorem that says that  skewness will
systematically increase for any mean preserving spread. Related to this point is the observation that
the median/mean ratio works well as a determinant of the tax level only if taxes are proportional.
But in the real world, consistent elements of progressivity characterise tax systems, so that the
chosen tax rate might be lower than what the median/mean ratio would suggest.
To conclude, there are sound theoretical reasons why inequality and growth might not be negatively
correlated. Certainly, if redistribution is negatively related to inequality and growth is positively
affected by redistribution, then the final prediction that inequality reduces growth would still hold.
But clearly the transmission mechanism would be different from those traditionally considered in
the literature. Furthermore, the new econometric evidence suggests that, at least within individual
countries, the short and medium-term relationship between inequality and growth might be positive.
All this calls for more research (both theoretical and empirical) in this area.
Section 3. A new research frontier: special interest politics and economic growth.
3.1 An overview of theoretical contributions
A classical example of special interest politics is lobbying through payments of campaign
contributions to political parties. Persson and Tabellini (2000) develop a model where lobbying is
detrimental to growth via its effect on sectoral allocation of resources. They consider an economy
where all individuals have the same initial endowment of resources, but only a proportion a < 1 of
total population owns a fixed factor (land). Investment can be directed to either of two sectors. The
first is an innovative sector where production takes place according to a AK technology and does
not require use of the fixed factor. The second is a traditional sector where the production function
exhibits constant returns to scale and does require use of the fixed factor in addition to capital.
Investment decisions depend on the tax rate of output in the two sectors. A discriminatory fiscal
policy is defined as the application of different tax rates in the two sectors. The rent that landowners
receive from land is greatar the higher the tax rate in the new sector relative to the tax rate in the
traditional sector. To obtain such a discriminatory sectoral taxation, landowners pay campaign
contributions to political parties. Parties are assumed to have a purely electoralist motivation and
the probability for a party to win the election is increasing in the amount of contributions received.
To receive contributions, parties must commit to the implementation of a discriminatory fiscal
policy once in office. Since campaign contributions will be effectively paid only to the party that20
commits to the highest level of discrimination, policy platforms will converge to the same tax gap.
Assuming that commitments are always maintained, the result is that the new sector is effectively
taxed more than the traditional sector. This in turn drives resources away from the innovative sector
towards the traditional sector and reduces aggregate investment and growth.
The model of Persson and Tabellini (2000) is based on the crucial assumption that capitalists (those
individuals that do not hold any land) cannot pay campaign contributions or, more generally, that
landowners are a better organised constituency, with tighter connections to the political system.
This assumption does no seem to be implausible. As a matter of fact, it is often observed that
lobbies linked to traditional sectors in an economy have considerable more say in domestic politics
than lobbies linked to emerging sectors. A second important feature of the model is that parties are
purely electoralist. That is, they are willing to change their policy platform in order to maximise
campaign contributions received from landowners. A possible alternative assumption is that parties
have ideological preferences that they try to implement once in office. Tabellini and Alesina (1990)
and  Alesina and  Tabellini (1991) show that when combined with high government turnover,
ideological differences between parties competing for office can lead to disproportionate
accumulation of debt. This result can then be used to provide a link between ideology, political
instability and growth. Given the  intertemporal budget constraint of the government, excessive
accumulation of debt will result in future higher capital taxation and hence lower economic growth.
Such an extension therefore provides a theoretical explanation of why political instability (defined
by the turnover in office rather than social distress) negatively affects economic growth.
Aghion and Bolton (1999) propose a model of special interest politics that incorporate the same
basic idea of Persson and Tabellini’s model. However, they focus more explicitly on innovation
rather than sectoral allocation of resources. In their framework, innovation is a main engine of the
process of economic growth. The adoption of the most innovative technologies is however a
political decision made by workers and entrepreneurs of different generations. If constituencies
linked to traditional sector are able to influence political decisions, then innovation is not permitted.
This in turn reduces economic growth, with further adverse effects on investment in research and
development. A possible outcome is thus a growth trap. Alternatively, the political cycle could
generate an economic cycle, where periods of technology adoption and fast growth are followed by
protection of traditional sectors and decline.
Another important instance of special interest politics which has received considerable attention in
the political economy literature is the “common-pool problem”. This can be defined as the
excessively high levels of public spending that result from a weak budget process. In coalition
governments, spending decisions are often decentralised at departmental level and each party in the21
coalition is de facto free to set public spending on its favoured target (i.e. provision of a specific
public good that is most preferred by the party’s supporting constituency). Velasco (1999) and
Drazen (2000) show that when government revenues are regarded by parties in the government as a
common-pool with free access, then spending proposals are significantly larger than what would be
optimal from the point of view of a social planner that maximise the concave utility function of a
generic individual. This is because each party internalises only a fraction (decreasing in the number
of parties in the coalition) of the cost of distortionary taxation that must be levied to finance higher
current spending (or to repay debt in the future). As in the “Tragedy of the Commons” (Tornell and
Velasco, 1992), the problem thus arises from the non co-operative behaviour of the decision
makers. If spending decisions were centralised in the hands of a strong Minister of Finance or
parties could take commitments to negotiated fiscal targets (that is, if the budget process were
strong), then the cost of spending would be fully internalised by the actors participating into budget
formation and the benevolent social planner outcome would be achieved.
The common-pool problem is clearly relevant for economic growth. The excessive spending that
results from the  appropriative strategies undertaken by parties in the coalition implies higher
taxation (to cover the extra-spending, if the government cannot run a deficit and hence the tax rate
is set residually, or to repay debt, if the government can run a deficit and debt must be paid back in
the future). To the extent that this taxation disincentivates capital accumulation, the growth is lower
than what it would be in a co-operative equilibrium (see also Persson and Tabellini, 2000, Chapter
14).
3.2 A simple econometric exercise: the impact of government fragmentation on economic growth
To assess the empirical relevance of special interest politics, I undertake an empirical test of the
prediction generated by the common-pool model. The argument has been extensively tested with
respect to fiscal policy formation (see Perotti and Kontopoulos, 1999 and Carmignani, 2000 for
recent examples). Following the seminal work by Roubini and Sachs (1989), the strategy adopted in
the literature is to regress a fiscal policy variable (size of deficit or change in the government
spending to GDP ratio) on a set of control variables and an indicator of the degree of dispersion of
political power within the government. Almost all contributions in this area measure dispersion as a
function of the number of parties in the government or the number of portfolios in the cabinet. That
is, more dispersed governments are assumed to be those numerically more fragmented. However, a
closer inspection of theoretical models reveals that a necessary condition for the common-pool
problem to arise is that parties in the coalition must represent different economic interests and hence22
they must have different preferences over the composition of public spending (or the provision of
public goods). Thus, it is not just the numerical fragmentation of the government that matters, but
also its degree of ideological fragmentation. Carmignani (1999 and 2000) proposes to measure the
ideological heterogeneity of coalition partners by the statistical dispersion of the ideological
locations on a ten point Left-Right policy scale of parties in the coalition.
13 I will make use of this
measure (labelled CI) in the econometric analysis that follows. The theoretical proposition to be
tested is thus that CI is negatively correlated with economic growth after controlling for economic
and environmental variables.
The growth regression which is estimated is specified as:
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where i denotes country and t denotes time, g is the average rate of growth of per-capita income
(source: Summers and Heston, 1991), X is a set of control variables (to be specified below), CI is
the index of ideological fragmentation of the coalition (source: Carmignani, 1999), SHARE is the
share of seats controlled by the government and e is an error term (source: Carmignani, 1999).
As discussed in Section 1, estimation of equation (1.8) involves a few methodological problems.
First is the choice of the appropriate estimation method. Under the assumption that disturbances are
identically and independently distributed with zero mean and finite variance, then a pooled OLS
estimator is consistent. However, to permit unobservable country-specific heterogeneity, the
constant term can be decomposed into an economy-specific and time-specific effect. Then, usual
fixed and random effect estimators can be used. However, if the set of control variables X includes
income at time t-1 then the models includes a lagged endogenous variable (as discussed in Section
2) and hence both the random and the fixed effect estimators might be biased. Furthermore, the
small size of the sample (see below) implies that the alternative unbiased estimator proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991) cannot be used here because it would produce too small standard errors.
In the end, I will estimate the model using both the pooled OLS and the factor models (random and
                                                       
13 Ideological locations of individual parties are taken from the Left-Right empirical policy scales commonly available
from the applied political science literature (e.g. Huber and Inglehart, 1995). Details on the construction of such scales
can be found in Laver and Schofield (1990, Appendix B). In these scales, each party is assigned a cardinal location (a
number) that represents its ideology. Normally, scales are defined on a ten point interval, with 1 representing extreme-
left and 10 extreme-right. If n is the number of parties in the coalition and qi is the cardinal location of generic partner i,


























fixed effect). I apply the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) to discriminate between the random and
the fixed effect and then report the results from pooled OLS as a point of comparison. I also
perform sensitivity analysis by estimating the model with and without the per-capita income at time
t – 1 among the set of regressors.
The second problem relates to the choice of the control variables. Given the results reported by
Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Ley and Steel (1999) and taking into account the peculiar nature of the
sample (see below), I choose a parsimonious specification that includes: the log of per-capita
income in period  t – 1 (GDPi(t-1)), the level of male and female human capital in period  t
(EDUMi(t) and EDUFi(t) respectively) and the growth rate of population in period t (POPi(t)).
EDUMi(t) and EDUFi(t) are proxied by the log of the average years of secondary schooling in the
male and female population aged above 25. POPi(t) is instead intended as a proxy for the growth
rate of labour force.
14 This basic specification is then extended to include physical capital
accumulation (INVi(t)), defined as the investment to GDP ratio in period t. The basic specification
is very similar to the one adopted by Forbes (2000), whilst the one with the investment ratio is
analogous to the “reduced form” of the structural model in  Benhabib and Spiegel (1997).
Furthermore, I perform additional sensitivity analysis of the results on the political variables by re-
estimating the model with different combinations of the economic variables.
A third issue concerns the availability of political data. The computation of the index CI that I use
to measure the degree of ideological fragmentation requires information on the ideological location
of individual political parties. Reliable and cross-country comparable information of this type is not
available for many countries, especially before mid 80’s. The series of political indicators
constructed by Carmignani (1999) go back to 1945, but include only the group of western European
countries. Given that Greece, Portugal and Spain were not democratic regimes for a fraction of
post-war era, that the UK never experienced coalition governments (and hence should not be
included in the test of a theoretical proposition that explicitly concerns coalition systems) and that
for Iceland and Luxembourg time-series of economic and education data are incomplete, the
number of countries on which the analysis can be conducted shrinks to 11 (Austria, Belgium,
Denamrk, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden).
Moreover, Barro and Lee’s data on education are available only as five year averages and for the
period 1960-1990. This represents a constraint on the choice of my sample period and the frequency
                                                                                                                                                                                       
14 The sources of data are: Summers and Heston (1991) for GDP and INV and Barro and Lee (1993) for EDUM, EDUF
and POP.24
of observations. All in all, a total of 66 observations are available for estimation: 6 for each of the
11 countries.
A final point concerns the inclusion of the variable SHARE on the r.h.s. of the growth equation. It is
possible that more fragmented coalitions are also numerically very large. Thus, if the model
includes variable CI only, then the estimated coefficient on CI is likely to capture both a
“fragmentation effect” and a “coalition size effect” on growth. Given that the coalition size effect
might be large and of sign opposite to the one expected for CI (see  Darby et al. 2000), it is
adviceable to isolate it using the simple variable SHARE.
Econometric results are reported in Table 3. For both model specifications two sets of estimates are
displayed: those obtained from either fixed effects or random effects (depending on which of the
two is favoured by the Hausman test) and those obtained from the pooled OLS. At the bottom of the
table, the value of the Hasuman test statistics and the associated p-value are also reported. To
interpret these statistics consider that high values of the test statistic favour the fixed effect model.
The first column refer to the estimation of the growth regression (1.8) without the investment ratio
on the r.h.s. The Hausman test favours the random effect model. The negative and statistically
significant coefficient on CI is consistent with the theoretical prediction generated by the common-
pool argument: the ideological fragmentation of the coalition negatively correlates with economic
growth. Intuitively, the direction of the casual relationship should go from fragmentation to growth.
Poor economic performance can determine the duration of the government and eventually its
ideological orientation, but it is difficult to construct a solid theoretical argument to sustain that
growth affects fragmentation. However, to account for possible joint endogeneity, I re-estimated the
growth equation using lagged values of CI as instruments. The coefficient on CI remains negative
and significant at usual confidence levels.
The positive coefficient on SHARE implies that when fragmentation is kept constant, numerically
larger governments are able to generate higher growth. This effect might be a consequence of the
higher stability of governments that build on a larger parliamentary basis (as suggested by Darby et
al., 2000). Of the economic variables, only GDP displays a coefficient statistically different from
zero. Possibly, EDUM and EDUF do not exhibit enough variation in my sample. However, using
other measures of education contained in the Barro and Lee data-set does not produce any relevant
change. Similarly, dropping EDUM and EDUF does not alter the results on the political variables.
The inclusion of other control variables (such as the government spending to GDP ratio, trade
policy variables and life expectancy) has no relevant effect on the coefficient of CI. Finally, the
random effect estimates of the coefficient on CI when initial GDP is dropped from the r.h.s. of the
model are identical to those reported in Table 3.25
In the second column, the growth equation includes the investment ratio. INV displays a positive
and significant coefficient (as one would expect) and results on the other economic variables do not
qualitatively change from those in the first column. Interestingly, the coefficient on CI still passes a
zero restriction test. Thus fragmentation affects the level of efficiency; that is, its effect on growth
“goes above and beyond its effect on the incentives to invest”. This means that in addition to the
mechanism incorporated in the basic common-pool problem, other channels could exist that link the
growth performance of a country to the structure of its government. Investigation of such channels
is certainly a promising avenue of future research.
4. Concluding remarks
Three major advances in the political economy literature on economic growth have been
investigated in this paper. The first one is an econometric issue. Most of the empirical results on the
political determinants of growth are obtained within the traditional framework of  Barro’s type
cross-section regressions. Some of the weaknesses of this framework have been recently pointed
out. I focused attention on the problems of omitted variables and model uncertainty. Although not
immune from shortcomings, panel data estimation methods represent the obvious way out to most
of the drawbacks of cross-sectional regressions. Interestingly, results on the empirical relevance of
political variables obtained from cross-section estimation might be significantly different from
those obtained from the estimation of panel models.
The second point which has been considered concerns the relationship between initial inequality of
income and wealth distribution and subsequent economic growth. Recent empirical findings
(obtained using high-quality data in panel models) show that the “common belief” that this
relationship is negative might not be true, at least within individual countries. This calls for a re-
consideration of some political economy theories that predict a positive effect of inequality on
growth.
The third major advance I have surveyed relates to the role of special interest politics in determining
growth. By favouring the implementation of discriminatory sectoral tax policies, the lobbying
activity of individuals linked to traditional sectors of the economy might drive resources away from
innovative sectors and hence reduce growth in a framework where innovation is its main engine.
Another instance of special interest politics is the “common-pool problem”, which characterise
spending decisions in coalition (fragmented) governments. The empirical relevance of the common-
pool argument for fiscal policy formation has been rather extensively tested. I have extended the
econometric analysis to study the impact of ideological fragmentation on growth. Results show that26
more ideologically heterogeneous coalitions are associated to lower growth rates after controlling
for some economic and environmental variables (including the investment to GDP ratio).
As noted in the paper, panel and time-series analysis are sometimes constrained by the limited
availability of data. Similarly, the implementation of econometric tests using more sophisticated
political indicators (such as the one used in Section 3) is currently possible only for a relatively
small sample of industrial countries. Future applied research will certainly benefit from the longer
span of economic and political data that progressively become available. On a more theoretical
ground, the investigation of the channels through which special interest politics affects growth is a
promising avenue of future work. For instance, coalition governments are certainly subject to the
pressure of interest groups with different policy preferences. This heterogeneity of interests is at the
basis of the common-pool problem. However, the empirical analysis in Section 3 shows that in
addition to its effect on the incentive to invest, political fragmentation might alter the “level of
efficiency” in the economy (or, perhaps the incentive to invest in alternative forms of capital) A
formalisation of this additional link would clearly be worthwhile, given the attention that
technological efficiency receives in the growth literature.27
Appendix
A1. Variables definition
g Growth rate of per capita GDP. Source: Summers and Heston (1991)
GDP Log of per-capita income. Source: Summers and Heston (1991)
EDUM Log of average years of secondary schooling of male population. Source: Barro and Lee
(1993)
EDUF Log of average years of secondary schooling of male population. Source: Barro and Lee
(1993)
POP Rate of growth of population. Source: Barro and Lee (1993)
INV Average investment to GDP ratio. Source: Summers and Heston (1991)
CI Ideological fragmentation of the coalition (see footnote 13 for details). Source:
Carmignani (1999)
SHARE Share of seats held by the ruling coalition. Source: Carmignani (1999).
A2. Table 1: Summary of cross-sectional empirical evidence on political determinants of growth
(see end of the table for explanatory notes; the table also reports some panel studies that have been
explicitly mentioned in the text).
Political Variable Reference Variable definition Finding
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A2. Table 1: Summary of cross-sectional empirical evidence on political determinants of growth
(continued)
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A2. Table 1: Summary of cross-sectional empirical evidence on political determinats of growth
(continued)
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A2. Table 1: Summary of cross-sectional empirical evidence on political determinants of growth
(continued)
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A2. Table 1: Summary of cross-sectional empirical evidence on political determinants of growth
(continued)
Political Variable Reference Variable definition Finding
Bureaucratic












Rule of Law (from
Keefer and Knack,
1995)










of law determines low
growth)
rule of law is an
“important”
determinant of growth.
a  Finding refers to the relationship between the political variable and economic growth, independently from how the
variable is defined. So, for instance, Persson and Tabellini (1994) use the income share accruing to the third quintile as
a measure of equality (rather than inequality). They obtain a positive estimated coefficient on this measure of equality,
which implies a negative relationship between inequality and growth. The reported finding is “negative relationship”.
b   Estimate a pooled cross-section time series using instrumental variables.
c   Estimates a system of three equations using 3SLS. Each equation refers to a fraction of total sample period.
d   Important determinants of growth are those whose posterior probability is above 0.8 (see Section 1). Not important
regressors are those whose posterior probability is below 0.2. This is the case for war dummy and revolutions and
coups. Political rights ad civil liberties are instead in the intermediate group of regressors whose posterior probability is
smaller than 0.8, but larger than 0.2.
e   Estimate panel models.
f   Taken from the data-set constructed by Deininger and Squire (1996).
g   Dependent variable is the investment ratio. Authors estimate a system of two simultaneous equations (see Section 2).
h Obtained from principal components analysis of  data on assassinations, political death, coups and democracy.
i   Cointegration analysis (see Section 1)
l   Indicators supplied by private firms that evaluate country-risk as a part of their business (see also Brunetti, 1997 for a
description of these indicators).
A3. Table 2: Summary of the evidence of the relationship between inequality and growth
Relationship Reference Finding
Initial income inequality on
subsequent growth
Initial income inequality on
degree of redistribution
see Table 1
Easterly and Rebelo (1993)
Keefer and Knack (1995)
see Table 1
positive relationship
negative, but not statistically
significant relationship32
A3.  Table 2: Summary of the evidence of the relationship between inequality and growth
(continued)
Relationship Reference Finding
Initial income inequality on
degree of redistribution
Redistribution on growth
Initial income inequality on
political instability, social
distress, political violence
Political instability on growth









Keefer and Knack (1995)
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Benhabib and Spiegel (1997)
positive, but not significant
relationship
negative relationship (not
significant if redistribution is
measured as the share of
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The growth rate is per-capita income. Standard errors are in brackets. The sample includes 66 observations. The
Huasman test always favours the Random effect estimator over the Fixed effect estimator.34
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